


The International Climate Negotiations
Structure, issues, and competing positions



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1 Introduction

The Bali Climate Change Summit, held in December 2007, marked the beginning of 2 years of global climate negotiations. The aim of the negotiations is to produce an international agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol once it expires in 2012.

The outcome of the 2 week summit was the ‘Bali Road Map’ which mapped out the broad terms of 2 years of negotiations to be concluded by December 2009 in Copenhagen.

In keeping with this theme, the ‘Bali Roadmap’ includes many journey analogies- complete with a destination, two vehicles, and a road that these vehicles will take.

The ultimate destination of a post-2012 global deal is to be guided by a ‘Shared Vision’, and the road towards the agreement defined by the series of meetings to be held between December 2007 and December 2009.

The vehicles are two: the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments of Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), and the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA).

The AWG-KP is carrying all parties to the Kyoto Protocol, and the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) is carrying all parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Countries that have ratified both the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC will travel in both vehicles.

The ‘Bali Action Plan’ is the AWG-LCA component of the Bali Roadmap and has 4 basic ‘Building Blocks’- Mitigation, Adaptation, Technology, and Financing. While these issues will guide talks within the AWG-LCA it is likely that all key issues will be dealt with by both groups.

The negotiations bring with them many challenges and a multitude of competing positions. The apparent consensus on core principles betrays a much greater level of complexity.

While all major nations may agree on the need to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions they differ in terms of both what the global goal should be, and disagree particularly on how this global cut should be shared between individual nations.

While all major nations recognise that Developed Countries will have to take the lead by taking on economy wide cuts, and Developing Nations should follow by constraining the growth of their emissions, there is less agreement on which countries should be classified as ‘Developed.’ There is also substantial disagreement about the extent to which Developing Country action should be contingent upon the provision of resources by the Developed world.

While all major nations recognise the need to increase the scale of financial support for both mitigation and adaptation activities there is much less agreement on the required scale, the

desired origin of such flows, the desirable governance arrangements for increased financial flows, and the countries that should be eligible for assistance.

The past year has seen significant discussion of these issues. The December 2008 talks in Poznan, Poland mark the midpoint for the negotiations and are providing the opportunity to take stock of the last year of talks. The Poznan talks will also set the agenda for what is set to be a heavy year of negotiations in 2009 as they transition from the ‘year of ideas’ to the ‘year of negotiations.’

This paper attempts to highlight the key issues for the ongoing negotiations, and the competing positions of major nations.

This paper does not attempt to deal with all issues and all nations- just those issues and nations that the author believes are big enough to substantially slow the progress of the negotiations.

2 A brief history of the International Climate Negotiations

UNFCCC

The international climate talks began in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit. At this wide-ranging conference the world produced its first global convention on combating global warming- the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March, 1994 and now has 192 signatories.

The UNFCCC does not require countries to take on particular greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets but has left space for Protocols that will. The first and only of these Protocols is the Kyoto Protocol.

Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol set binding emissions reductions for developed countries and countries in transition to reduce their overall emissions by an average of 5.2% on 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012.

The 5.2% reduction was for the group of countries as-a-whole so individual countries received different emissions reduction goals. Australia negotiated an 8% increase in 1990 emissions over the 2008–2012 period.

The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005, and now has 182 parties. Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol on December 12, 2007.

The Bali Roadmap- towards a post-2012 Climate treaty

The current round of talks is aimed at achieving a global climate agreement for the post-2012 period (after the ‘first commitment period’ of the Kyoto Protocol expires). These talks began in Bali, Indonesia during December 2007 and are scheduled to conclude by December 2009 in Copenhagen, Denmark. The outcome of the Bali Summit was the ‘Bali Roadmap’ which maps out the terms of the 2 years of negotiations.

The post-2012 agreement is likely to require a greater number of developed countries to take on emissions reductions targets, promote emissions reduction activities amongst developing countries, include provisions for the scaling up of financial flows for adaptation financing and technology transfer between countries, and to clearly articulate the ultimate collective goal of these activities- the so called ‘Shared Vision.’

The Bali Roadmap so far...

Bangkok, Thailand, March 31- April 4, 2008 *(AWG-LCA 1 and first half of AWG- KP 5.1)*

The Bangkok meeting was the first major meeting after the Bali Summit and included the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA 1) and part 1 of the 5th meeting of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments of Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Protocol.

The Bangkok meeting was largely an administrative meeting with the AWG-LCA agreeing on its 2008 work programme for the year including the scheduling of 8 workshops on specific elements of the Bali Action Plan over 2008.

The AWG-KP explored the means by which Annex 1 Parties should meet their emissions reduction targets in a post-2012 agreement. The Parties indicated that emissions trading and project based flexibility mechanisms like JI and CDM should continue post 2012. The AWG-KP also discussed treatment of bunker fuels, Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF Rules) and Sectoral approaches.¹

Bonn, Germany June 2-12, 2008

(AWG-LCA 2 AWG-KP-5.2)

The Bonn Meetings played host to the second meeting of the AWG-LCA and the second half of the fifth meeting of the AWG-KP.

The AWG-LCA held three separate workshops on enhanced action for adaptation, technology and finance. Parties also began discussions on the ‘Shared Vision’, mitigation, and the work programme for 2009.

The AWG-KP continued to discuss the means by which Annex 1 countries could meet emissions reduction targets post 2012. Parties focused on the flexible mechanisms, LULUCF, greenhouse gases, sectors and source categories, and sectoral approaches to emissions reductions.²

Accra, Ghana August 21- 27, 2008

(AWG-LCA 3 AWG-KP 6.1)

The Accra meetings played host to the third meeting of the AWG-LCA and the first half of the sixth meeting of the AWG-KP.

The AWG-LCA held two in-session workshops on cooperative sectoral approaches and on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD). The AWG-LCA also continued to share ideas on mitigation, adaptation, technology, and finance, and on the nature of the ‘Shared Vision.’

Parties agreed to compile ideas and proposals on all these issues before the Poznan talks. This was completed with the November 20, 2008 release of *Ideas and proposals on paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan* by the Chair of the AWG-LCA.³

¹ ENB. 2008a, p.1

² ENB, 2008b, p.1

³ FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/16

The AWG-KP continued to discuss the means by which Parties could meet emissions reduction goals with specific focus on the flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol, the treatment of LULUCF.⁴

Poznan, Poland December 1- 12, 2008

(AWG-LCA 4, AWG-KP 6.2)

The Poznan talks are currently playing host to the fourth meeting of the AWG-LCA and the second half of the sixth meeting of the AWG-KP.

The meeting will allow Parties to take stock of the past years work and further synthesise key proposals for a global climate deal.

The key outcome of the Poznan talks will be the AWG-LCA ‘Chairs Text’ from which draft text for a global climate deal will be ultimately drawn. The Chairs text will be an update of the *Ideas and proposals on paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan* released on November 20.

The release of the Chairs Text will mark the transition from the ‘year of ideas’ to the ‘year of negotiations.’

For Australia, the Poznan talks will be the final international meeting before it announces its 2020 emissions target.

It was initially expected that Australia’s mid-term target would be revealed in the lead up to the Poznan talks. The announcement that the target will now be revealed on December 15, 2008, three days after the close of the Poznan talks suggests that they will be an important input into the final decision.

The focal point for the talks has so far been the 25-40% reduction on 1990 levels by 2020 for industrialised nations. The 2020 target adopted by Australia will be the primary indicator of the vision that Australia has for a global deal and the role that it wishes to play in influencing such an outcome.

⁴ ENB, 2008, p.1

3 Key issues and stumbling blocks in the negotiations

3.1 Emissions Targets

The central determinant of an effective deal to prevent further global warming is the ultimate level of emissions reductions that the international community commits to and achieves.

While 2°C of warming (above pre-industrial levels) has been identified as a key threshold for dangerous climate change, the lowest emissions reduction scenario modelled by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is for warming of between 2 and 2.4 degrees by 2100. There are ongoing calls for the IPCC to model sub-2 degree emissions reduction scenarios.

To limit warming to the 2-2.4 degree range the international community will have to take on global emissions reduction goals of 50% to 85% on 2000 levels by 2050 respectively.⁵

While the ‘Shared Vision’ will most likely include a 2050 global emissions target the focus of the current round of negotiations will be largely concentrated on the 2020 target.

3.1.1 2020 targets for Developed Countries: 25-40% on 1990 levels by 2020

The Bali Road Map references the need for industrialised nations to reduce emissions by 25-40% cuts on 1990 levels by 2020 in order to limit warming to between 2 and 2.4 degrees by 2100.⁶

The European Union, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil are all calling on Developed Nations to take on 25-40% cuts on 1990 levels by 2020.

Australia will reveal its 2020 target on December 15, 2008 in the days immediately following the Poznan talks. This target is likely to trigger significant debate about the level of ambition of developed nations, and the distribution of emissions cuts amongst the developed world. It will be a source of considerable contention.

Australia supported the inclusion of the 25-40% target range in the Bali Road Map but has since remained silent on whether it supports the target. There is ongoing speculation that Australia will announce a watered-down 5-15% emissions reduction target.

Such an announcement would greatly complicate negotiations between the developed nation bloc and could inadvertently give major developing nations like India, China, Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia a ‘get out of jail free’ card.

⁵ IPCC, 2007, p.776

⁶ ENB, 2007a, p.20

3.1.2 2020 targets for Developing Countries: 15-30% below ‘baseline’ emissions growth

The Bali Road Map referenced the need for developing countries to achieve ‘substantial deviation from baseline emissions’ to limit warming to 2.0 to 2.4 degrees of warming.⁷

Recent work has identified that in order to play its part in limiting global warming to between 2 and 2.4 degrees Celsius by 2100 developing nations will need to reduce emissions by between 15 – 30% below what they would have otherwise been.⁸

The European Union is calling upon developing nations to accept these controls.

Developing nations are likely to continue to tie any such movement on emissions to the provision of finance and technology by developed countries as agreed to under the Bali Action Plan.

Figure 1: Required emissions reductions for Annex 1 & non-Annex 1 Countries

Scenario category	Global average temperature increase (by 2100)	Annex 1	Non-Annex 1
I: 450 ppm CO ₂ e	2.0 – 2.4 °C	-25% to -40% below 1990	Non-annex 1 total: -15% to -30% below baseline
III: 550 ppm CO ₂ e	2.8 – 3.2 °C	-10% to -30% below 1990	Non-annex 1 total: 0% to -20% below baseline
IV: 650 ppm CO ₂ e	3.2 – 4.0 °C	0% to - 25% below 1990	Non-annex 1 total: 10% above to 10% below baseline

SOURCE: Höhne & Ellermann, 2008, p.2

⁷ ENB, 2007a, p.16

⁸ Hohne & Ellerman, 2008, p.2

3.2 Which countries should now be considered ‘developed?’

The distribution of global income has changed since the Kyoto Protocol was first negotiated in 1997. Many countries that are currently considered ‘developing countries’ have comparable, and in some cases superior, levels of wealth and human development to countries that are currently considered ‘developed.’

Australia has produced the ‘Turkey list’ the ‘Ukraine List’ and the ‘Portugal list’ to highlight which ‘developing nations’ have higher incomes or Human Development Indicators greater than these ‘developed countries.’ Japan has also tabled the parameters by which ‘developed nations’ should be identified.

The question of ‘differentiation’ has been, and will continue to be, an ongoing issue in these talks. Candidates for graduation are currently opposing further differentiation while countries currently considered ‘developed countries,’ keen to ensure an ‘equitable’ distribution of liabilities in a post-2012 agreement, are arguing for a more ‘accurate’ differentiation of nations.

Given the stakes, neither group is likely to readily back down from these positions.

3.3 Technology Transfer

Developing country parties are calling upon developed countries to transfer the technology that they need to reduce emissions and adapt to the inevitable impacts of climate change. The Bali Action Plan called for the scaling up of technology transfer between nations.

Current mechanisms for technology transfer include those under the UNFCCC as well as other mechanisms outside of the United Nations Process. Under the UNFCCC the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) seeks to advance technology transfer under the Convention.

The two primary UNFCCC vehicles for technology transfer are the Global Environment Facility (GEF) which allocates and disburses around USD 250 million each year for technology transfer projects, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which provides developed countries with an incentive to invest in emissions reduction projects in developing nations.⁹

Mechanisms outside of the UNFCCC process include the *Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development & Climate* and various other bilateral agreements amongst nations.

While all nations may agree on the need for the scaling up of technology transfer there is a lot less agreement on the actual mechanism that is needed to achieve this. As a general rule developing nations are calling for the relaxation of Intellectual Property Rights and direct transfers from developed nations governments through a mechanism under the authority of the UNFCCC- where they will have greater control over its operation.

⁹ UNFCCC, 2008a, p.6

Developed nations on the other hand are cautious about a new mechanism under the Convention instead wishing to focus on the emboldening of existing mechanism and are calling upon the developing world to make the governance and institutional changes that are needed to create an ‘enabling environment’ for greater private sector investment in the developing world.

A negotiation group for developing nations known as the ‘G77 + China’ released its proposal for a technology transfer mechanism in September. This proposal will undoubtedly continue to be a focal point for the negotiations.

3.4 Enhanced action on Adaptation

The Bali Action Plan calls for ‘enhanced action on adaptation’ in a new post-2012 international climate agreement.

Currently, there are a range of adaptation activities under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Under the convention all nations are obliged to ‘formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes... to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change.’¹⁰

Under the Convention, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have the option of developing National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) which are designed to provide an assessment of urgent adaptation needs. At this stage, Adaptation Financing is limited to the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol which is funded by a 2% levy on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects.¹¹

Ongoing negotiations for ‘enhanced action on adaptation’ will continue to focus on a new Adaptation body under the Convention, greater public financing of developing country adaptation actions by developed countries, the development of Regional adaptations centres, the extension of the CDM Levy to Joint Implementation, and Emissions Trading, greater reporting of adaptation measures and challenges, and the emboldening of existing mechanisms under the convention.

As a general rule, developing nations want a new body under the Convention and greater public financing by developed countries, whereas developed nations want existing adaptation mechanisms to be emboldened before new measures are considered and want to see a greater integration of adaptation activities into national planning in developing countries.

3.5 Financial Transfers & Investment

The current round of negotiations will continue to have a strong focus on the need for financial transfers from the developed to support climate change mitigation and adaptation activities in developing countries. While a Financial Mechanism currently exists under the Convention it is often criticised for lacking the necessary scale and functionality.

¹⁰ Article 4, paragraph 1b, UNFCCC

¹¹ UNFCCC, 2008b, p.4

At this stage, mitigation, adaptation, and technology transfer activities under the Convention are funded by three vehicles- the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Trust Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)- all of which are funded by voluntary contributions from Developed Countries and administered by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). An Adaptation Fund is funded by a 2% levy on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects and is administered by its own board.

A 2007 report by the UNFCCC Secretariat, *Report on the analysis of existing and potential investment and financial flows* relevant to the development of an effective and appropriate international response to climate change) found that the additional investment and financial flows needed in 2030 to address climate change amounts to 0.3% to 0.5% of 2030 global GDP and 1.1% to 1.7% of global investment in 2030.

While most nations recognise the need for the ‘scaling up’ of financial transfers there is much less agreement on how to achieve this. Developing nations are calling upon public financing by Developed Countries through a new subsidiary body under the UNFCCC- where Developed countries will have a greater say on how the money is used. Developed nations, as a general rule, accept the need for public funding of some activities but believe that the bulk of the necessary financial resources will be provided by private investment and are calling upon developing countries to promote ‘enabling environments’ for such private investment.¹²

3.6 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation & Degradation (REDD)

An oft quoted weakness of the current international climate framework is that it does not provide incentives to reduce deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. Given that up to 20% of global emissions arise from deforestation Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) will continue to be a key focus of negotiations for a post-2012 agreement.

While methodological issues (how countries measure & monitor deforestation and degradation emissions) will continue to be an important underlying issue, the main focus of negotiations will continue to be around how REDD will be financed. Negotiations are centred around the ‘fund vs. market’ debate.

Under the ‘fund approach’ developing nations would draw upon an international fund designed to cover the opportunity cost of not logging their forests. Under the market approach, REDD would be able to generate international emissions credits that would be bought by international market participants.

While there are a range of issues with a market approach to REDD the central stumbling block is the issue of ‘additionality.’ Those that oppose a market approach to REDD argue that developed nations should not be able to ‘offset’ their own emissions by purchasing REDD credits. Instead, they argue that REDD should be in addition to emissions reductions within developed nations. Proponents of a ‘fund approach’ to REDD argue that an international fund would best safeguard the ‘additionality’ of REDD.

¹² UNFCCC. 2008a. P.1

Brazil currently supports a fund approach to REDD whilst developed nations support a market approach. More specifically, some developed nation groups, like the EU, support a transitional approach to REDD- whereby a fund approach is used in the short-to-medium term while methodological issues are resolved and a market approach in the long run.

4 Competing Positions of Major Greenhouse Gas Emitters

4.1 Australia ¹³	2020	2050
<i>Emissions targets</i>	To be announced on December 15, 2008 ¹⁴	60% on 2000 levels
<i>Domestic policy</i>	Emissions Trading Scheme (Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme), 20% by 2020 Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET), and Energy Efficiency Measures	
<i>Shared Vision</i>	Supports inclusion of a long term global emissions reduction goal informed by trajectory of collective mid-term (2020) target	
<i>Developed Countries</i>	<p>‘All developed countries should agree to economy-wide targets as part of the post 2012 outcome.’</p> <p>Individual targets should ‘represent a comparable mitigation effort taking into account national circumstances, such as population growth, economic growth, energy production structure, and natural resource endowment.’</p> <p>Calls for use of ‘per capita effort’ and ‘aggregate economic costs’ as indicators of ‘comparable effort’</p>	
<i>Developing Countries</i>	<p>Many Non-Annex 1 countries should graduate to Annex 1</p> <p>Australia has produced the ‘Ukraine List’, the ‘Portugal List’ and the ‘Turkey List’ to suggest candidates for ‘graduation.’</p> <p>Developing’ countries to take on ‘a range of mitigation actions’ to ‘reduce emissions below business as usual’</p> <p>Calling for ‘standardised (emissions) reporting requirements across both developed and developing countries.’</p>	
<i>Technology Transfer</i>	<p>Believes that the dominant driver of technology development and deployment should continue to be the private sector</p> <p>Australia is thus placing the onus on developing countries to create ‘appropriate and stable enabling environments, economic incentives, and supportive national policy frameworks.</p> <p>Public investment should occur in ‘areas with no market or where the market has failed.’</p>	

¹³ Unless otherwise stated, information is drawn from Australia 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e, and 2008f

¹⁴ Media Release, November 28, 2008. Minister for Climate Change and Water

<p><i>Technology Transfer (Continued)</i></p>	<p>Australia believes that many rapidly industrialising non-Annex 1 countries have the capability and capacity to be ‘involved in the production and distribution of low emission and adaptation related technologies at many different levels.’</p> <p>‘Countries with a capacity to develop and deploy clean technologies should focus their efforts on cooperative research, developments and the deployment of new clean technologies with others.’</p> <p>‘International efforts to facilitate deployment of clean technologies should prioritise those countries- in particular the least developed countries- that will benefit most.’</p> <p>Favours the emboldening of existing mechanisms rather than developing new mechanisms under the UNFCCC.</p> <p>Does not support creation of a Subsidiary Body for Technology under the UNFCCC</p>
<p><i>Adaptation</i></p>	<p>Supports increased financing for Adaptation</p> <p>Believes that Adaptation financing should be directed to ‘those most vulnerable to climate change.’</p> <p>Would like to see objective criteria established to identify which countries are most vulnerable to climate change (suggests use of IPCC reports), and those countries with the least internal capacity to adapt (suggests use of Human Development Index (HDI) or OECD DAC data as proxies).</p> <p>Believes that decisions about which Adaptation activities should be prioritised should be left to individual countries.</p> <p>Believes that adaptation actions within individual nations should be aligned with their broader sustainable development strategies and integrated into national planning and budget processes.</p> <p>Does not support creation of a new body for Adaptation under the UNFCCC. Believes that existing systems should be built upon and deficiencies corrected.</p>
<p><i>Finance</i></p>	<p>Accepts need for ‘scaling up’ of financial transfers from developed to developing world.</p> <p>But...believes that not all mitigations actions should be supported by the developed world. (‘While incentives for clean development will continue to be important, self-funded national actions by developing countries will also be necessary.’)</p>

<p><i>Finance (Continued)</i></p>	<p>Believes that private sector financing will play a much greater role and that developing countries should direct greater effort into promoting ‘enabling environments’ for such private sector investment. Particularly with regard to ‘robust and transparent’ governance arrangements.’</p> <p>Accepts that there will be a need for greater public investment by developed countries in developing countries but seeks ‘objective mechanisms to determine eligibility for financial assistance based on criteria that are fair, give priority to the most vulnerable developing countries, and can appropriately respond to future scientific, technological and economic developments.’</p> <p>Australia believes that it is ‘inappropriate’ for the G77 + China to state that the scale of financial flows should be between 0.5- 1% of developed country GDP before undergoing ‘comprehensive examination’ of required global financial flows on the basis of ‘robust, (and) transparent data based on internationally agreed methodologies.’</p> <p>Australia believes that the ultimate vehicle for such financial flows should be left to the discretion of individual nations- whether it be through ODA, bilateral agreements, regional agreements, or multilateral agreements under the UNFCCC</p>
<p><i>REDD Financing</i></p>	<p>Supports marked based financing under the UNFCCC for REDD</p> <p>Participation should be voluntary</p> <p>Believes that funds approach may be desirable but only as a transitional measure until the readiness and capacity exists for the inclusion of REDD in carbon markets</p>
<p><i>GDP per capita (USD-PPP)</i></p>	<p>\$37,300</p>

4.2 European Union ¹⁵	2020	2050
<i>Emissions targets</i>	20% on 1990 unilaterally, 30% on 1990 if joined by other developed nations	No explicit 2050 target for the EU but strong supports 80-95% cuts on 1990 for developed countries. At least 50% reduction on 1990 levels for the world as a whole
<i>Domestic Policy</i>	EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and national level complementary measures	
<i>Shared Vision</i>	Global warming not to exceed 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Climate response to be considered in the broader context of sustainable global development.	
<i>Developed countries</i>	Developed countries must take the lead on emissions by taking on 30% on 1990 cuts by 2020	
<i>Developing countries</i>	<p>Developing countries as a group, with the help of the developed world, need to achieve ‘substantial deviation from baseline emissions’ by 2020. This would entail 15-30% reductions below business-as-usual (BAU) emissions growth.</p> <p>Developing countries should identify three types of mitigation options:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) those that are privately cost effective- which should be implemented unilaterally 2) those that entail additional costs which can be supported and enabled by the developed world, and 3) actions that would take the countries emissions profile further below the 15-30% below BAU which could be financed by international offset mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 	
<i>Technology Transfer</i>	<p>Recognises need for a ‘massive shift in the scale and pace in the global development and deployment of technologies for mitigation and adaptation.’</p> <p>Does not believe that enhanced technology transfer should occur completely under the UNFCCC. Enhanced action should occur largely through existing mechanisms.</p>	

¹⁵ Unless otherwise stated, information is drawn from European Union 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, and 2008d

<p><i>Technology Transfer (Continued)</i></p>	<p>Calling upon developed countries to ‘scale-up both their RD&D efforts and support...developing countries efforts for technology needs assessments, human and institutional capacity building, design of national deployment schemes, and participation in voluntary cooperative technology-oriented agreements.’</p> <p>Calling upon developing nations to create ‘enabling environments’ for such transfers.</p>
<p><i>Adaptation</i></p>	<p>Calling for greater effort to identify priority technological needs for adaptation</p> <p>Calling upon governments to create enabling environments to promote private sector investment in adaptation projects</p>
<p><i>Finance</i></p>	<p>Supports scaled up financing for technology transfer but believes that private investment flows should dominate public investment.</p> <p>Public financing from developed countries should only address ‘market gaps’ and should be viewed as a catalyst for private investment</p> <p>Public financing from developed countries should be focused on ‘assistance to support developing countries efforts for technology needs assessments, human and institutional capacity building, design and implementation of national (technology) deployment schemes,</p>
<p><i>REDD Financing</i></p>	<p>Supports both fund and market based approaches. Fund approach likely to dominate in the medium term, market approach more likely in the long term</p>
<p><i>GDP per capita (USD-PPP)</i></p>	<p>\$33,482 (2006)</p>

4.3 United States¹⁶ Bush Administration	2020	2050
<i>Emissions targets</i>	Emissions to continue to grow until 2025	Mixed support for global target of 50% reduction on 1990 levels
<i>Domestic Policy</i>	No meaningful Federal policy infrastructure. Many State led measures including the Western Climate Initiative and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).	
<i>Shared Vision</i>	Advocates a sharing of views on what the ‘Shared Vision’ entails but believes that time is ‘better spent on the concrete elements of the Bali Action Plan.’	
<i>Developed Countries</i>	No formal position other than to say that regardless of the quantity of targets it is desirable that the form of the commitment (voluntary vs. binding) should be the same for all developed country parties	
<i>Developing Countries</i>	Will not sign an international agreement without developing countries. While the content of actions may differ between different countries the nature of commitments (voluntary vs. binding) should be the same for all nations.	
<i>Technology Transfer</i>	<p>Prefers that increases in Technology Transfer occur through existing mechanisms.</p> <p>‘The United States holds no assumption that enhancing...technology promotion tools necessarily means creating new institutions under the UNFCCC.’</p> <p>Greater technology transfer to be greatly scrutinised to ensure it is essential to achieve the ultimate objective of the convention</p>	
<i>Adaptation</i>	<p>Supports emboldening of existing institutions and mechanisms to ‘assist’ the most vulnerable countries</p> <p>Calling upon developing nations to create ‘enabling environments’ for private sector investment in adaptation projects in developing nations</p> <p>Believes countries should not discount the role of ODA in adaptation financing</p>	
<i>Finance</i>	Prefers that increases in Financial Transfer occur through existing mechanisms.	

¹⁶ Unless otherwise stated, the following is drawn from United States 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, and 2008d

	<p>Will continue to promote technology and finance transfers through non-UNFCCC mechanisms</p> <p>‘The United States holds no assumption that enhancing financial...promotion tools necessarily means creating new institutions under the UNFCCC.’</p>
<i>REDD</i>	Supports a combination of international and domestic initiatives for REDD
<i>GDP per capita (USD-PPP)</i>	\$45,800

4.4 United States Obama Administration	2020	2050
<i>Emissions targets</i>	Return to 1990 levels by 2020.	80% on 1990 ¹⁷
<i>Domestic Policy</i>	Cap and Trade Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to be implemented, 25% by 2025 Mandatory Renewable Energy Target, 15% energy efficiency target for 2020, \$150 billion to be invested over 10 years for new energy infrastructure. ¹⁸	
<i>Developed Country Action</i>	Developed countries need to take ‘the first step’ ¹⁹	
<i>Developing Country Action</i>	<p>Developed nations to take the first step but Developing countries will need to take the ‘second and third steps’.²⁰</p> <p>No confirmation on what specific actions will be demanded of the developing world.</p> <p>Will re-engage the UNFCCC process but will also ‘invigorate’ the Major Economies (MEM) Meeting process</p>	
<i>Technology Transfer</i>	<i>Formal position yet to be announced</i>	
<i>Adaptation</i>	<i>Formal position yet to be announced</i>	
<i>Finance</i>	<i>Formal position yet to be announced</i>	
<i>REDD Financing</i>	<i>Formal position yet to be announced</i>	
<i>GDP per capita (USD-PPP)</i>	\$45,800	

¹⁷ Obama (2008)

¹⁸ *ibid*

¹⁹ Pearce, 2008, p.13

²⁰ *ibid*, p.13

4.5 New Zealand²¹ Clark	2020	2050
<i>Emissions targets</i>	No specific 2020 target but supports 25-40% cuts for Annex 1 countries as a whole.	‘Carbon Neutral’
<i>Domestic Policy</i>	Emissions Trading Scheme phased in between 2009 and 2013. Energy Efficiency Programs and support for Renewable Energy	
<i>Shared Vision</i>	Should include long term global emissions reduction goal	
<i>Developed Countries</i>	Supports 25-40% on 1990 levels by 2020 as an ‘indicative range of emissions for Annex 1 Parties as a group’	
<i>Developing Countries</i>	<p>Will only accept the 25-40% reduction range if part of a global deal in which non-Annex 1 Parties seek to reduce emissions by 15-30% below their baseline emissions growth</p> <p>Wants greater differentiation between countries. Would like ‘a dynamic continuum with different commitments, actions and support for different countries based on objective criteria.’</p> <p>Differentiation should relate to mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer, and financing</p> <p>Differentiation criteria could include GDP per capita and/or Human Development Index (HDI)</p> <p>Seeks graduation protocol under the Convention</p> <p>Calling for identical emissions reporting requirements for major emitters</p>	
<i>Technology Transfer</i>	Enhanced action should build on existing mechanisms- both inside and outside the UNFCCC process	
<i>Adaptation</i>	<p>Adaptation funding to be ‘targeted at the most vulnerable countries.’</p> <p>Calling for ‘all countries to help the most vulnerable countries adapt to the physical impacts of climate change.’</p>	
<i>Finance</i>	Recognises need for increased finance for mitigation, adaptation, and technology	

²¹ Unless otherwise stated, information is drawn from New Zealand 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e, 2008f, and 2008g

	<p>Expects that increase in financial transfers would come with greater ‘mutual accountability’ between countries</p> <p>Would like to see development of ‘objective criteria to guide eligibility for...the provision of finance.’</p> <p>Increased funds could come from redirection of ODA</p> <p>Is not opposed to the development of new financing mechanisms but wishes to see weaknesses in existing mechanisms addressed before further consideration of new mechanisms.’</p>
<i>REDD Financing</i>	Has signalled support for use of carbon markets to finance REDD
<i>GDP per capita (USD-PPP)</i>	\$27,200

4.6 Japan ²²	2020	2050
<i>Emissions targets</i>	7.9% on 1990 levels (Although the Japanese Environment Minister Tetsuo Saito has since stated that Japan will need to reduce emissions by at least 25% on 1990 levels by 2020/25)	57.16- 78.58% on 1990 levels
<i>Domestic Policy</i>	Voluntary emissions trading scheme (V-ETS)	
<i>Shared Vision</i>	Supports inclusion of global emissions reduction target of at least 50% by 2050 (does not specify base year)	
<i>Developed Countries</i>	All Developed countries to take on economy wide targets ‘Comparability’ of effort amongst developed countries to be determined on the basis of the ‘Sectoral Approach which compiles reduction potentials in each sector, using indicators such as energy efficiencies or GHG intensities, with due consideration to the marginal abatement costs and total abatement costs as a percentage of GDP.’	
<i>Developing Countries</i>	Some non-Annex 1 Countries should graduate to developed country status. Candidates for graduation include: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) All OECD Member Countries 2) Non-OECD Members whose ‘economic development stages are equivalent to those of OECD members.’ 3) Countries that do not satisfy (1) and (2) but volunteer to take on Annex 1 style commitments Remaining ‘Developed Countries’ should be divided into one of three groups: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Developing countries that are ‘expected to take further mitigation commitments, based on their economic development stages, response capabilities, shares of GHG emissions in the world.’ These countries should take on binding targets for ‘GHG emissions per unit’ or ‘energy consumption per unit’ for major sectors or for the economy as a whole. 2) Developing countries ‘whose emissions are very little 	

²² Japan, 2008

	<p>and which are vulnerable to adverse effects of climate change, especially Least Developed Countries (LDC's) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Which should submit a 'voluntary national action plan, including policies and measures for mitigation, to the Conference of Parties (UNFCCC).</p> <p>3) Other Developing Countries. Which should also submit a 'voluntary national action plan, including policies and measures for mitigation, to the Conference of Parties (UNFCCC).</p> <p>Japan would also like to see graduation criteria developed by which developing countries can graduate to the 'upper group.' (Group 1)</p>
<i>Technology Transfer</i>	Supports increased cooperation by developed and developing countries, through 'the relevant international organisations' on technology development
<i>Adaptation</i>	Supports strengthening of Adaptation measures
<i>Finance</i>	Supports the improvement of existing financial mechanisms New financial contribution obligations should take into consideration existing contributions under the UNFCCC, existing contributions to other multilateral funds, ODA contributions, technology assistance, R&D Investment, and private sector investments
<i>GDP per capita (USD-PPP)</i>	\$33,500

4.7 Russia ²³	2020	2050
<i>Emissions targets</i>	No stated position	No domestic 2050 target but supports a 50% global target. Targets should be voluntary
<i>Domestic Policy</i>	40% energy efficiency target by 2020	
<i>Shared Vision</i>	Shared Vision should be further clarified. Shared Vision should be based on ‘the ultimate objective of the Convention.’	
<i>Developed Countries</i>	Supports sectoral targets. Russia believes that the 25-40% range for Developed Countries is ‘unreasonable.’	
<i>Developing Countries</i>	Supports graduation of some non-Annex 1 countries to Developed Country status. Differentiation should be made on the basis of GDP per capita and ‘other standard criteria.’ Advocates Developing Country action and argues that ‘this global challenge can only be met by a global effort, in particular, by contributions from all major economies, consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.’ Believes that voluntary actions by Developing Countries should be recognised in an international climate regime. (In accordance with the so called ‘Russian Proposal’)	
<i>Technology Transfer</i>	No formal position	
<i>Adaptation</i>	No formal position	
<i>Finance</i>	No formal position	
<i>REDD Financing</i>	No formal position	
<i>GDP per capita (USD-PPP)</i>	\$14,800	

²³ Russia (2008)

4.8 China²⁴	2020	2050
<i>Emissions targets</i>	No economy wide target	No economy wide target
<i>Domestic Policy</i>	20% energy efficiency target by 2010. Renewable Energy Target of 10% by 2010 and 15% by 2015. Increase forest cover to 20% by 2020.	
<i>Shared Vision</i>	Does not advocate the inclusion of a global 2050 emissions target. Focus of Shared Vision should be on process of achieving the ‘ultimate objective of the Convention.’	
<i>Developed Countries</i>	China believes focus should remain on developed country action. Developed countries should take on ‘at least’ 25-40% cuts on 1990 levels by 2020 and 80-95% on 1990 by 2050.	
<i>Developing Countries</i>	<p>There should be no further differentiation between Developing Countries.</p> <p>China does not advocate a specific target for Developing countries.</p> <p>Developing country action should be ‘nationally appropriate’ and considered in the context of sustainable development.’</p> <p>Developing Country action should be ‘supported and enabled’ by technology transfer, financial assistance, and capacity building from Developed Countries.</p>	
<i>Technology Transfer</i>	<p>Establish the ‘Subsidiary Body for Development and Transfer of Technologies’ under the Convention.</p> <p>The SB will, inter alia, assess the technology needs of Developing Country parties.</p> <p>The SB will also guide and supervise a ‘Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund’ to finance technology development, deployment and transfer.</p>	
<i>Adaptation</i>	<p>Establish ‘Regional Adaptation Network Centres’ in Asia, Africa, the Pacific, and South America for capacity building and knowledge sharing.</p> <p>Establish ‘Adaptation Committee’ under the Convention to provide guidance for the enhancing adaptation.</p>	

²⁴ China (2008)

<p><i>Finance</i></p>	<p>Financial transfers of between 0.5 -1% of annual Gross National Product (GNP) of Annex 1 countries for mitigation, adaptation, and technology transfer.</p> <p>Mitigation - ‘Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund’ to finance technology development, deployment and transfer.</p> <p>-Mitigation Fund</p> <p>-MTAF to be funded predominantly from annual budgets of Developed Countries.</p> <p>The funding scale should be 0.5-1% of annual Gross National Product (GNP) of Annex 1 nations.</p> <p>Adaptation- Adaptation Fund should be established under the Convention. Annex 1 Countries to finance the Adaptation Fund.</p>
<p><i>REDD Financing</i></p>	<p>Decision to participate in REDD mechanism sits with the individual developing country</p> <p>No stated preference for fund or market approach.</p>
<p><i>GDP per capita (USD-PPP)</i></p>	<p>\$5,400</p>

4.9 India²⁵	2020	2050
<i>Emissions targets</i>	Has pledged to restrict its per capita emissions to that of the developed world	Has pledged to restrict its per capita emissions to that of the developed world
<i>Domestic Policy</i>	<p>The Indian government unveiled its National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) on June 30, 2008</p> <p>Under the plan India is pursuing, inter alia, energy savings of 10,000 MW by 2012, installing 2000 MW in solar thermal and photovoltaic's and is planning on increasing forest cover from 23 to 33% by 2017.</p>	
<i>Shared Vision</i>	<p>Advocates inclusion of stabilisation target and timeframe to achievement.</p> <p>Emissions reductions should be identified with respect to a 1990 baseline.</p>	
<i>Developed Countries</i>	Developed countries to take on cuts of 'more than' 25-40% on 1990 by 2020.	
<i>Developing Countries</i>	Full incremental costs of Developing Country action to be covered by Developed countries.	
<i>Technology Transfer</i>	<p>Executive Body on Technology as a subsidiary body under the Convention.</p> <p>Supported by Multilateral Climate Technology Fund.</p> <p>Technology Action Plan to serve as starting point for Executive Body on Technology.</p> <p>The Technology Action Plan will support Research, Development, Transfer and Diffusion.</p>	
<i>Position on Adaptation</i>	<p>Currently concentrating on principles for a new mechanism for enhanced Adaptation measures.</p> <p>Financing should be Additional, Adequate, Predictable, and have a degree of Automaticity.</p> <p>These funds should be used to cover the incremental costs of adaptation projects.</p>	

²⁵ Unless otherwise stated, information is drawn from India 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, and 2008e

	<p>Additional costs preferably met with a grant but concessional finance also acceptable.</p> <p>Full cost financing for Adaptation capacity building exercises.</p> <p>Adaptation governance structure under the Convention and include an Executive Board, supported by an Advisory Body and a Secretariat and Trustee.</p>
Position on Finance	<p>0.5% of Developed World GDP</p> <p>Multilateral Climate Technology Fund.</p> <p>Financial resources to be additional to ODA and other net foreign inflows.</p>
GDP per capita (USD-PPP)	\$2,600

4.10 Brazil ²⁶	2020	2050
<i>Emissions targets</i>	No economy wide emissions targets	No economy wide emissions targets
<i>Domestic Policy</i>	<p>Has pledged to end net-deforestation by 2015 and reduce deforestation by 72% on 1996-2005 levels by 2017</p> <p>Policies to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy.</p>	
<i>Shared Vision</i>	Supports inclusion of global emissions goal but wants to see explicit inclusion of principles and mechanisms by which the long term goal will be achieved	
<i>Developed Countries</i>	<p>Seeks to retain Annex 1 and non-Annex differentiation (as opposed to developed vs. developing countries)</p> <p>Emissions targets should be a function of historical responsibility</p> <p>Annex 1 countries to take on emissions targets of ‘at least 25-40%’ on 1990 levels by 2020.</p>	
<i>Developing Countries</i>	<p>Non-Annex 1 countries will restrict emissions growth (deviation from baseline) if supported by finance and technology transfer from Annex 1 countries.</p> <p>Does not stipulate degree of ‘deviation from baseline’ for non-annex 1 countries</p> <p>Seeks recognition of existing measures in non-annex 1 countries</p>	
<i>Technology Transfer</i>	<p>Supports G77 Proposal for a new Technology mechanism under the Convention</p> <p>Seeks establishment of an Executive Body on Technology and a Multilateral Climate Technology Fund (MCTF)</p>	
<i>Adaptation</i>	<p>Calling for establishment of regional Adaptation centres</p> <p>Calling for new Adaptation funding mechanism under the Convention</p> <p>Funding should be additional to ODA and be ‘predictable, stable, and adequate.’</p>	
<i>Finance</i>	Supports G77 proposal for development of a new Financial mechanism under the Convention to fund both mitigation and	

²⁶ Brazil (2008)

	adaptation activities in non-Annex 1 countries.
<i>REDD Financing</i>	Does not support use of REDD as an ‘offset’ for Annex 1 emissions REDD financing to be provided by Annex II countries Supports fund approach. Has established a \$21 billion to be funded by international donors by 2021.
<i>GDP per capita (USD-PPP)</i>	\$9,500

4.11 South Africa ²⁷	2020	2050
<i>Emissions targets</i>	Peak at 58.34% above 1990 levels by 2020/25 ²⁸	No set target but has pledged to reduce emissions in absolute emissions after peaking in 2020/25
<i>Domestic Policy</i>	Considering an emissions tax. Renewable energy, clean coal, and nuclear.	
<i>Developed Countries</i>	25-40% cuts on 1990 by 2020	
<i>Developing Countries</i>	<p>Supports ‘substantial deviation’ of baseline emissions for Developing countries</p> <p>Extent of Developing Country Action ‘dependent on the provision of finance, technology, and capacity building by developed countries’</p> <p>Proposes establishment of a register of ‘Nationally-appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) by developing country parties’</p>	
<i>Technology Transfer</i>	Supports G77 & China proposal for development of a Technology Mechanism under the Convention	
<i>Financing</i>	Supports G77 China proposal for development of a Financial Mechanism under the Convention	
<i>GDP per capita (USD-PPP)</i>	\$9,700	

²⁷ Unless otherwise stated, the following information is drawn from South Africa 2008a and 2008b

²⁸ <http://www.southafrica.info/about/sustainable/climate-300708.htm>

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